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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
under the compulsory terms of a union contract was involuntary
termination and therefore awarded unemployment compensation.
The Leach decision and other conflicting cases therefore present an
issue deserving final resolution by the Ohio Supreme Court.
In light of the required liberal construction of the Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Act, 9 the supreme court ought to
affirm the granting of unemployment compensation benefits to a
pensioner retired under a union contract. Further support for this
approach can be found in the statute itself. In drafting the statute,
the legislature is presumed to have had full knowledge and informa-
tion concerning this issue, ° and it is therefore submitted that by
enumerating all disqualifications under the statute,21 the General
Assembly clearly did not intend to prohibit dual benefits. 22
JOHN B. LINDAMOOD
FEDERAL TAXATION - DEDUCTIONS FOR EXHAUSTION
OF PROPERTY - SPACE AS A VALID DEDUCTION
John J. Sexton, 42 T.C. 785 (1964).
Federal income tax is as a general rule based upon net income
derived over a specified period. In determining net income derived
from the operation of a trade or business, all operating costs and ex-
penses allowable as deductions must be determined and deducted
from gross income. The production of net income usually involves
the use of capital assets which wear out or are exhausted in use.
Such wear or exhaustion as the case may be is usually gradual, ex-
tending over a period of years. With respect to trade or business
capital, such wear or exhaustion, ordinarily called depreciation, con-
stitutes an operating cost and hence is deductible from gross income.'
A new dimension was added to this basic concept of deprecia-
tion in John J. Sexton.' There, the petitioner, who was in the busi-
ness of operating refuse dumps, purchased an eighty acre tract of
land for $150,000. On this land was a clay pit into which he
19. Albaugh v. Alsco, Inc., 179 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1961); see OHIO REV. CODE
§ 4141.46.
20. 54 OHIO JUR. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 5 (Supp. 1964).
21. See OHIo REV. CODE § 4141.29(D).
22. See also OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.36; Teple, Supplemental Unemployment Bene-
fits, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 583 (1959).
[VOL 16:10131016
Federal Taxation
dumped refuse collected from patrons of his business. The peti-
tioner determined that the reasonable salvage value of the land after
the pit was filled was $44,000' Hence, the $106,000 difference
between the cost price and the salvage value was the value of the
air space which would be exhausted by his business use of filling the
pit with refuse collected from his patrons.4 After having this land
surveyed, the petitioner determined that there were 2,528,787 cubic
yards of air space available for dumping. The total value of the air
space divided by this number of cubic yards of air space available
for dumping was found to amount to a charge-off of 4.19 cents per
cubic yard of air space exhausted. Petitioner had surveys taken at
the end of each year to determine the space filled by a year's dump-
ing;' that figure times the charge per cubic yard of air space ex-
hausted was the amount of depreciation taken for that particular
year.
In seeking to sustain the validity of this deduction, the petitioner
contended that he had not purchased the eighty acre tract of, land for
the value of the land, but rather for the value to him of the dump-
ing space made available by the clay pit located thereon. A part of
this space, the petitioner contended, was being consumed -each year
for business purposes. On the other hand, the Commissioner argued
1. INT. RIEv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) states: "There shall be allowed as a deprecia-
tion deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a
reasonable allowance for obsolescence) - (1) of property used in the trade or business,
or (2) of property held for the production of income."
2. 42 T.C. 795 (1964).
3. The salvage value-was based on the price of corresponding property in this same
area. Petitioner paid almost four times the usual selling price because: (1) dumping
space in the Chicago area was at a premium; and (2) the seller knew why petitioner.
wanted the property and priced the land accordingly. Salvage value is determined in.
Treas. Reg. § 1.67 (a)-1 (c) (1) (1954) as: "the amount (determined at the time of
acquisition) which is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an
asset when it is no longer useful ... in the production of his income and is to be re-
tired from service by the taxpayer .....
4. 'Respondent argued that the value of the land when filled would be more than the
original cost. However, the Tax Court observed that excavated areas subsequently
filled with garbage are not suitable for building construction without extensive use of
costly pilings and cassions.
5. The method of apportionment usually termed the "unit of production method" is
peculiarly applicable in determining depreciation for property used in the exploitation
of natural resources. By dividing the cost less the estimated salvage value by the esti-
mated available reserve of raw material, a unit cost is obtained which, when multiplied
by the units produced during a given year, indicated the depreciation sustained for the
year.
6. Initially, the petitioner attempted to compute the air space used by keeping a daily-
tally on the amount dumped into the pit. However, the method proved ineffective
due to compaction after dumping. It was at this point that petitioner recognized the
need for annual surveys.
1965] 1017
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that the only asset purchased by the petitioner was land;' that the
only time the cost of land could be depreciated as a business loss is
when the land is sold and there is a loss sustained in a closed trans-
action.
The Tax Court allowed the deduction, holding that a separate
right to ownership in the air space could be recognized as property.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two authorities:
(1) the decision in Mattie Fair,8 where a gift of a right to air space
was upheld as a valid deduction; and (2) Internal Revenue Bulle-
tin No. 1964-30,' which recognized a gratuituous conveyance of a
restrictive easement to the United States Government as a charitable
contribution. In light of these two authorities, the court stated:
"We perceive no reason why such rights should not be the subject of
depreciation as wasting assets in the business of this paxpayer."'0
The court held that petitioner's method of computation was
within section 1.167 (a)-I (a) of the Treasury Regulations govern-
ing a reasonable allowance for depreciation.'1 Petitioner had set
aside an amount in accordance with a reasonable, consistent plan so
that the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value,
would equal the cost of the property. 2
Although this case might initially appear to present a novel situ-
ation, the Tax Court applied nothing more than basic principles of
property and tax law in resolving the issues.'3 The extent of owner-
7. Land is generally recognized as non-depreciable simply because it is not subject to
wear and tear, exhaustion, or obsolescence. This proposition is specifically stated in
Treas. Reg § 1.1 6 7 (a) -2: "The depreciation allowance in the case of tangible property
applies only to that part of the property which is subject to wear and tear, to decay or
decline from natural causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence. The allowance does
not apply to inventories or stock in trade, or to land apart from the improvements or to
physical development added to it .. " (Emphasis added.)
8. 27 T.C. 866 (1957). Here, petitioners claimed as a charitable deduction the gift
of a perpetual right to build, own, and maintain five additional stories over an existing
two-story building. The Tax Court allowed this deduction, stating: "The right to use
the air space super-adjacent to the ground is one of the rights in land. These air rights
are frequently the most valuable rights connected with the ownership of land since the
value of commercial property consists almost exclusively of the right of the owner to'
erect business and industrial structures thereon." Id. at 872.
9. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 30, at 6.
10. John J. Sexton, 42 T.C. 795, 801 (1964).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a) -1(a).
12. Petitioner had, in filing his tax return for the years 1953 through 1956, called
this deduction a depletion. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction as a depletion,
but did allow the deduction as amortization. The court distinguished depletion and
amortization as not applying to the present case and permitted the deduction as depre-
ciation.
13. Extensive research has revealed no other instance where the court has allowed
depreciation of air space.
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ship of land has traditionally been regarded as including any adja-
cent air space controlled by the owner above the land. This view
was apparently derived from the maxim asque ad coelum, generally
regarded as having originated with Lord Coke.'4 This recognition
of control of the use of air space over land progressed until courts
began to permit a landowner to maintain an action for trespass for
invasion of the air space immediately over his land.8 The land-
owner's right to maintain this trespass action is derived through his
title to the land. Similar results have been. reached in eminent
domain cases where it has been found that the landowner owns at
least a portion of the overlying space. 6
Another test of ownership in this area is whether the property
is capable of being divided and conveyed to another.' Two states,
Colorado' 8 and New Jersey,'9 have settled the question as to owner-
ship, subdivision, and conveyance of air space to third parties by
legislation. These statutes expressly permit estates, rights, and in-
terests in areas above the ground to be conveyed to persons other
than the owners of the land. Also, an Illinois statute specifically
empowers railroads to divide their real estate into different lots or
levels, and to sell or lease any part or parts of such real estate at,
above, or below the surface of the ground, providing there is no ir-
14. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 583 (3d ed. 1939).
15. Overhanging projections have been held to constitute trespasses. Purato v. Chieppa,
78 Conn. 401, 62 Ad. 664 (1905) (eaves of a house); Cumberland Tel-Co. 'yv. Barnes,
30 Ky. L Rep. 1290, 101 S.W. 301 (Cr. App. 1907) (crossarms on a telephone pole).
Accord, Hall v. Browning, 195 Ga. 423, 24 S.E.2d 392 (1943) (firing a projectile
across another's land); Town of Ailey v. Central States Elec. Co., 204 Iowa 1246, 214
N.W. 879 (1927) (stretching a wire across another's land).
16. These cases generally have held that some right of the owner to his surface air
space has been "taken." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945) (continuous
low flights over appellee's land constituted a compensable taking by the federal gov-
ernment); Portsmouth v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (repeated firings of
coastal guns across plaintiff's land). In United States v. Causby, supra at 264, the Court
at least defined the minimum amount of air space the landowner may claim: "The
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use
in connection with the land." Accord, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
noted in 14 W. RES. L. REV. 376 (1963).
17. For an excellent treatise on many of the early problems in this area see Bell, Air
Rights, 23 ILL L. REv. 250 (1928). Well aware of the apparent incongruity of the
situation, this writer noted:
Land has been the most corporeal of corporeal things. It is real estate. Can
an abstract thing like space be bought and sold as land? The air as such ob-
viously cannot. But can space, as such, be dealt in? It is a long cry from
transferring Whiteacre by handing over a piece of sod, to a written convey-
ance of a right to all space within the boundaries of Whiteacre be-
ginning at a certain imaginary plane and extending from there on up. Id.
at 252.
18. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-12-1 (1963).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-19 (1964).
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pairment of the property for railroad purposes.21 Surely if the right
of an owner to convey air space separate from the land is cognizable
by the law of real property,21 then the use of air space in conjunc-
tion with the land, as in the instant case, ought to be similarly rec-
ognized in the application of tax principles.
The second basic principle of law involved in the John J. Sexton
case concerned the depreciation requirements. Although deprecia-
tion rights are usually thought of as applying to tangible property, 2
the Regulations also provide for the depreciation of intangible as-
sets,2 if such assets are known from experience or other factors to
be of use in business or in the production of income for a limited
period of time. The length of such use must be capable of determi-
nation with reasonable accuracy. In the subject case, the petitioner
merely sought recognition of the fact that an asset was being
consumed by his business, and thus aptly urged application of sec-
tion 1.167 (a) -(3) of the Regulations. The principle question with
respect to intangible property is: does it have a definitely limited
useful life? In the subject case, petitioner's intangible asset did
have a definitely limited useful life - the air space could be used
only until exhausted by becoming filled with refuse. Furthermore,
petitioner knew exactly when the asset would be exhausted. It is
therefore clear that this use of air space could be properly classified
as an intangible asset.2"
Although this case presents an interesting example of the novel
results that can be reached by combining two seemingly unrelated
areas of the law, it nevertheless will serve as an important and val-
uable precedent for land owners concerned with the tax aspects of
utilizing the space above and below the surface of their lands.
DAVID A. BASINSKI
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 114, § 174a (Smith-Hurd, 1954).
21. The builders of the Merchandise Mart Building reportedly paid $2,500,000 for
air space alone. Drew, Usque Ad Coelum, 4 CONN. B.J. 276, 277 (1930).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
24. The necessary element lacking in most unsuccessful attempts at depreciation of
intangibles is that a definite period of use cannot be determined. See, e.g., Falstatf
Beer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 744 (5th Cit. 1963) (beer distributorship);
Fromm Labs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 727 (7th Cit. 1961) (research
and development costs); Battle Creek Food Co. v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 537 (6th
Cit. 1950) (back royalties); National Weeklies, Inc. v. Reynolds, 43 F. Supp. 554 (D.
Minn. 1942) (subscription lists).
25. Confusion could arise from the instant case in that it may be thought that air
was allowed to be depreciated. However, it was not air, but rather the exhaustion of
air space which was permitted as a valid deduction.
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